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INTRODUCTION
In the next 20 minutes I will talk about the power of clinical
trials and guidelines to influence cardiology practice. I will
also amplify concerns others have raised about the threat
that financial conflicts of interest pose to the industry–
academic relationships that are so essential for medical
progress. I will close with a few thoughts about the cost
implications of the many cardiovascular treatment advances
we celebrate. Although most of my comments reflect
circumstances in the U.S., many of the issues I raise resonate
around the world.
Powerful scientific and socioeconomic forces continue to
transform medical practice and research, especially in this
country. In the past 15 years, the parallel clinical trial,
practice guideline, and continuing education movements
combined to create one of the greatest paradigm shifts in the
history of medicine. What I call the “trial-guideline-
education process” is having profound effects on cardiology
research and practice—effects almost as significant as the
invention of the stethoscope in France in 1816 and the
electrocardiograph in Holland in 1902 (1). Although the
impact of the trial-guideline-education process is especially
evident in America, it’s growing in Europe and elsewhere.
The interesting thing for us is that we’re alive—witnessing
this phenomenon revolutionize cardiology in real time.
CLINICAL TRIALS AND PRACTICE GUIDELINES
The modern randomized clinical trial was invented in the
middle of the twentieth century, but its prehistory dates
back exactly 250 years—to 1753—when British naval sur-
geon James Lind showed that citrus fruit cured scurvy.
Although it took two centuries for clinical trials to gain
momentum, a few individuals along the way promoted
quantification as a tool to evaluate treatments. For example,
in the 1830s, French physician Pierre Louis (2) challenged
those seeking new therapies to support their conclusions
with statistics, not subjective impressions. He explained,
“Let those who engage hereafter in the study of
therapeutics … demonstrate, rigorously, the … degree of
influence of any therapeutic agent on the duration, progress,
and termination of a particular disease.”
But Louis’s modern-sounding message didn’t have much
impact. Most drugs introduced in the nineteenth century
proved to be ineffective, and eventually almost all vanished
without a trace. Harvard anatomist and author Oliver
Wendell Holmes (3) anticipated this in 1860 when he
wrote, “I firmly believe that if the whole materia medica, as
now used, could be sunk to the bottom of the sea, it would
be all the better for mankind—and all the worse for the
fishes.” Gradually, things improved as experimental phar-
macology replaced empirical polypharmacy and as new
government regulations helped filter out useless and unsafe
drugs.
Turning to more recent history and to cardiac drugs, the
advances of the past 50 years are astonishing. For perspec-
tive, consider this advice for angina that Paul Dudley White
(4), America’s leading cardiologist, published in 1951: “The
most effective drug [for angina] after nitrates is
alcohol … when nitrates are not available an ounce or two of
whisky … may give quite rapid relief.” When White wrote
this, penicillin was a new drug, polio was epidemic, and
there were no effective oral diuretics.
The pace of medical discovery accelerated rapidly after
World War II as America and a few other countries
endowed biomedical research and as pharmaceutical com-
panies collaborated with clinical investigators and statisti-
cians to conduct controlled trials (5). British researchers
published the first clinical trial using individual randomiza-
tion in 1948. Their pioneering study showed that strepto-
mycin could cure pulmonary tuberculosis, a powerful con-
clusion that changed practice and closed countless TB
sanitariums. In the U.S., in 1951, the newly organized
National Heart Institute, now the National Heart, Lung,
and Blood Institute (NHLBI), funded the world’s first
international, multi-center cardiovascular clinical trial. It
was designed to test the effectiveness of aspirin, cortisone,
and adrenocorticotropic hormone (ACTH) in treating acute
rheumatic fever and in preventing rheumatic heart disease
(6).
The clinical trial movement grew slowly until the 1970s
when the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and industry
began plowing huge piles of money into this type of research
(Fig. 1). In this fertile climate a new type of clinical
investigator emerged, a precursor of the modern “trialist,”
who used computers and statistics to sift through mountainsFrom the Mayo Clinic, Division of Cardiovascular Diseases, Rochester, Minnesota.
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of data collected from patients following a therapeutic
intervention. These researchers, and those who funded their
research, were looking for treatment effects invisible to the
clinician’s eye.
During the 1980s, the trial process matured rapidly in
response to creativity and criticism. Today, despite some
lingering concerns (Table 1), well-designed trials are gen-
erally viewed as trustworthy trails to the truth. But clinical
trials don’t lead to absolute truth in the same sense that an
element, like sodium, has an exact atomic weight. This
helps explain the noisy debates that sometimes follow the
publication of trials that could have significant implications
for practice.
During the last decade, the number of cardiovascular
trials grew phenomenally because heart disease is so preva-
lent and has such enormous economic implications—both
in terms of costs to society and potential for corporate
profits. Today, the number of cardiovascular trials is mind-
boggling. For example, a recent PubMed search for the term
“acute myocardial infarction” limited to clinical trials pub-
lished in English since 1990 returned 1,740 references. And
consider this: on average, a new cardiovascular trial is
launched every other day (7) (Fig. 2). Despite the terrific
reference tools available in this era of the Internet and
evidence-based medicine, it’s impossible for anyone to
retrieve and review—let alone understand—the vast amount
of data published weekly by our supercharged clinical trial
industry. And trial results are just one part of an avalanche
of potentially relevant information that threatens to bury
busy clinicians.
This leads me to a bit of pragmatic advice for cardiolo-
gists who—like me—feel overwhelmed by all this new
knowledge. I mean no disrespect to trialists or the dynamic
trial movement when I say that doctors don’t have to
memorize acronyms or detailed trial results to provide
quality care. Fortunately, there are many talented academics
working hard to synthesize trial results into reviews for
practitioners. And if you do want to know about a particular
study, Cardiosource (www.Cardiosource.com), the Col-
lege’s new educational Web site, is an efficient path to a
comprehensive compendium of clinical trials.
Although I don’t think cardiologists have to memorize
acronyms or detailed trial results, we do have to keep up
with what I’ll call the “current common wisdom of cardiac
care.” The American College of Cardiology–American
Heart Association (ACC/AHA) guidelines, invented al-
most two decades ago—and now updated regularly—are
one shortcut to some of this common wisdom. It took
several years for the guideline movement to mature and gain
the trust of physicians. Those who invented the approach a
generation ago promoted guidelines as a way to help achieve
certain goals (8) (Table 2).
Today, guidelines are woven into the fabric of modern
medicine—especially in cardiology and in America. The
ACC/AHA guidelines are authoritative, evidence-based
documents that synthesize and organize vast amounts of
relevant information. Practitioners, payers, and policy mak-
ers respect and use our guidelines because they fulfill most of
the criteria that define optimal guidelines (Table 3). Al-
though full-text guidelines can be intimidating because of
their size and substance (the recent update for the manage-
ment of patients with unstable angina and non–ST-segment
elevation myocardial infarction was 93 pages long and
included 552 references), executive summaries and pocket
Table 1. The Most Common Criticisms of Clinical Trials
Relate to:
● the problem of underpowered trials
● the unknown effects of polypharmacy
● the decision to change a trial in progress
● the short duration of follow up
● the choice of arbitrary end points
● the use of surrogate end points
● the practice of post-trial subgroup analysis
● the unsupported claims of class effect
● the gap between statistical and clinical significance
● the implications of publication bias
● the consequences of conflicts of interest
Figure 1. NHLBI total budget (decade subtotals in $ billion). Derived from NHLBI fiscal year 2002 fact book (Bethesda, Maryland), page 69.
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versions distill their essence (9). Patients also have access to
them through Cardiosource and the College’s Web site
(http://www.acc.org).
Various approaches have been developed to help incor-
porate guideline recommendations into patient care. The
ACC-sponsored Guidelines Applied in Practice (GAP)
projects have shown that some methods designed to influ-
ence individual practice patterns and encourage institutional
changes, such as the use of standard orders in post-infarct
patients, lead to improved outcomes (10). Although guide-
lines are a valuable adjunct to traditional clinical decision-
making methods, they must never become the Pied Piper of
physicians, leading each of us to write the same prescription
for every patient. It is important to emphasize that guide-
lines complement clinical judgment, they don’t replace it.
Clinical trials and practice guidelines address populations
and average patients. Doctors take care of unique patients—
one at a time (11).
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
Although the trial-guideline-education process has helped
to inform decisions and enhance care, it presents some
challenges. I will focus on one: financial conflicts of interest
that pose a threat to the vital but vulnerable interface
between academic medicine and industry. I won’t address
conflicts that practitioners face except to say that in this
country the American Medical Association (AMA), the
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America
(PhRMA), and other organizations have produced guide-
lines that help define and defend the ethical boundaries
between individual doctors and industry.
A custom blend of altruism and self-interest motivates
each individual, institution, and company involved in every
phase of health care, whether it’s inventing drugs, conduct-
ing trials, developing guidelines, educating doctors, or
performing procedures. As medical professionals, we must
assure patients and the public that altruism is our primary
motivating force. And because academics influence so many
important parts of the trial-guideline-education process,
they have a special responsibility to ensure its integrity.
Academics help design and carry out clinical trials. They
also publish papers, write editorials, give talks, and create
guidelines that influence practice. These are valuable activ-
ities, and the significant time and energy academics devote
to them must be acknowledged—and compensated.
Today, a significant portion of this compensation comes
from industry, either directly or indirectly through an
institution or sponsoring organization. Industry’s role in
funding our nation’s academic enterprise has grown for
several reasons, including the fact that subsidizing research
and education with patient-care dollars is now obsolete. In
this context, academic centers under stress (and many are
Table 3. Ideal Guidelines Will Be:
● created by informed and unbiased experts
● based on the best available published evidence
● concise and clearly written
● documented with appropriate references
● clinically relevant and useful in practice
● flexible enough to acknowledge that each patient is unique
● realistic about the cost implications of the recommendations
● accompanied by explicit conflicts of interest statements
● accepted as authoritative by all interested parties
● used consistently and appropriately in all relevant contexts
● proven to enhance clinical outcomes in pertinent populations
● reviewed and revised regularly by unbiased experts
Figure 2. Number of clinical trials listed in Cardiovascular Trials Review (1996 to 2002 editions). *2002 total includes pre-1998 trials deleted in the 7th
edition because of space (1,532 pages). Derived from Kloner RA, Birnbaum Y. Cardiovascular Trials Review. Darien, CT: Le Jacq Communications.
Thanks to Robert A. Kloner, MD, PhD.
Table 2. Guidelines were Promoted as a Tool to Help:
● improve health care outcomes in individuals, institutions, and
populations
● narrow the gap between statistically validated knowledge and practice
● reduce local and regional variations in care patterns and resource
utilization
● control health care costs by discouraging unnecessary tests and
treatments
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today) must not encourage faculty members to supplement
their institutional salaries with excessive income from in-
dustry that informed but disinterested observers would
consider to be excessive for the services rendered.
Several things compel us to confront the potential, real,
and perceived conflicts of interest that threaten the impor-
tant and ever-expanding academic–industry interface. Two
months ago, in the Journal of the American Medical Associa-
tion, Yale researchers reported a detailed study of conflicts in
biomedical research. They concluded (12): “Financial rela-
tionships among industry, scientific investigators, and aca-
demic institutions are widespread. Conflicts of interest
arising from these ties can influence biomedical research in
important ways.” I doubt these statements surprised many
readers, because so many other authors have raised similar
concerns (13–18). Two years ago, Marcia Angell (19) wrote
an editorial in the New England Journal of Medicine with the
provocative title, “Is academic medicine for sale?” If we ever
hope to answer this question with an emphatic “No!” we
need to do a better job of defining, identifying, and
managing conflicts of interest.
The challenges are real because economic incentives
energize certain critical components of the clinical trial
industry. In fact, the U.S. government purposely infused a
big dose of entrepreneurialism into academic research in
1980, when the Bayh–Dole Act, named for two senators,
was signed into law. This legislation (that allowed univer-
sities to patent and commercialize inventions resulting from
federally funded research) was a powerful catalyst of inno-
vation and technology transfer—with tremendous benefits
for patients and the public. But the Bayh–Dole Act also
increased the chance that research institutions and some of
their staff members would confront conflicts of interest.
Conflicts of interest are unavoidable in the trial-
guideline-education process that evolved during the past
half-century. But their impact can be minimized if we reach
consensus on thresholds beyond which real conflicts are
more likely to occur, set reasonable dollar limits for specific
services, and require detailed disclosures. Academic medi-
cine, corporate bioscience, organizations, our government,
and other interested parties should develop common stan-
dards that reflect a shared commitment to ensuring the
integrity of the trial-guideline-education process. Disclosure
statements should be required not only for obvious end-
product activities, such as publications and presentations,
but also for other functions like committee and editorial
work, where conflicts might influence outcomes. To be
effective, these statements must be explicit and accessible,
and they must be used when appropriate.
We can’t treat conflicts of interest like some family secret
no one talks about. We must become more comfortable
asking and answering pertinent questions about the sources
and substance of industry funding that might influence
individuals, institutions, and organizations. Meanwhile, we
must continue to invent and implement more effective ways
to protect and promote productive partnerships between
industry, academia, and practitioners—because these rela-
tionships are vital to medical progress and optimal health
care. We can’t allow publicity or profit potential to blur our
focus on patients or compromise the credibility of the
trial-guideline-education process. Fortunately, there are
several signs that we’re addressing the challenge. Recent
examples include the Association of American Medical
Colleges guidelines on conflicts of interest in clinical re-
search, the Accreditation Council for Continuing Medical
Education standards for commercial support, and the joint
statement by cardiovascular journal editors on conflicts of
interest (20,21).
Along with many other organizations, the ACC also
navigates these turbulent waters. The Journal of the American
College of Cardiology competes with other leading journals to
publish clinical trial results, and our annual meeting features
them (22). With the AHA, the College creates and distrib-
utes guidelines that influence prescriptions and procedures
(23). The ACC prides itself on being the premier source of
continuing medical education for cardiovascular specialists.
This means the College has a special obligation to ensure
the integrity of the trial-guideline-education process. Be-
cause the ACC, like other professional societies, depends on
industry to help support our mission, we must be alert to the
potential for bias. Acknowledging all of these things, the
College continues to enhance its conflict-of-interest policies
and procedures.
The profession and the public must understand that
industry support—like government funding—is vital to the
vast academic enterprise that discovers, digests, and distrib-
utes new knowledge. If we want to ensure medical progress,
there’s no viable alternative. At the same time, capitalistic
incentives catalyze invention and innovation that can benefit
patients. And it’s unrealistic to expect industry to be
financially disinterested in the trial-guideline-education
process. Companies sponsor clinical trials because they hope
to find proof of efficacy they can translate into profitable
products. If a trial shows that a pill or device is beneficial,
why shouldn’t the company that makes it seek publicity,
market penetration, and profit?
Understandably, as one part of this dynamic process,
companies seek experts and opinion leaders to help dissem-
inate positive trial results and to interpret their implications
for patient care. We need to keep bias out of these
important educational functions. For a generation, statisti-
cians have worked tirelessly to protect clinical trials from
bias. Others involved later stages of the trial-guideline-
education process must be sure bias doesn’t seep into these
critical components of knowledge transfer that can influence
practice in profound ways.
THE COST CONSEQUENCES
OF TRIALS AND GUIDELINES
The phenomenal successes of the world’s biomedical re-
search enterprise present another challenge. No country can
1240 Fye JACC Vol. 41, No. 8, 2003
Presidential Address April 16, 2003:1237–42
afford all the effective new pills, products, and procedures
produced by our energized academic–industrial complex.
Two decades ago, the pioneers of the guideline movement
argued that their tool would not only enhance care but
would also save money by discouraging unnecessary tests
and treatments. While that has happened in certain situa-
tions, evidence-based guidelines have also fueled increases
in health care costs. These cost increases aren’t always due to
innovations in diagnosis and treatment. Sometimes, they
reflect decisions to redraw the boundaries between “normal”
and “abnormal” values, as a result of epidemiological or
natural history studies. For example, lowering target cho-
lesterol or blood pressure levels in entire populations has
profound implications for prescription drug use. We expect
that higher up-front costs for preventing cardiovascular
disease will pay dividends later. Nevertheless, the cost
trajectory of cardiology’s extraordinary track record of in-
vention and innovation is problematic as we look to a future
filled with promise.
Cost concerns are one reason Medicare and other payers
to use the trial-guideline process to inform their reimburse-
ment decisions. In cardiology, last year’s Multicenter Auto-
matic Defibrillator Implantation Trial II (MADIT-II) and
the subsequent updated ACC/AHA/North American So-
ciety of Pacing and Electrophysiology (NASPE) arrhythmia
device guideline are examples of this phenomenon (24,25).
This trial showed that putting a prophylactic implantable
defibrillator in patients with a 30% or lower ejection fraction
at least one month post infarct resulted in a 5.6% absolute
risk reduction for death. This trial triggered a series of
related events because the findings were compelling and the
financial implications were enormous.
This life-saving device is an excellent example of the
promise of inventions and the power of trials. But the cost
implications are staggering. There are estimates that each
year in the U.S., as many as 150,000 patients will meet
MADIT-II criteria for a defibrillator. Although the actual
domestic market will be smaller, there is consensus that this
single technological safety net will cost more than a billion
dollars a year. This explains why the Center for Medicare
and Medicaid Services (CMS) solicited testimony from the
ACC and other experts to help them relate our new device
guideline recommendation to reimbursement policy. This is
a situation where evidence rather than self-interest (which is
potentially present at several levels) must drive discussions
and decisions. Having said that, reimbursement decisions
are inevitably somewhat subjective and context sensitive.
Although solid scientific or statistical evidence doesn’t
recognize national boundaries, each country will have to
decide how to address the cost consequences of the potent
products of the trial-guideline-education process.
The invention and trial-proven effectiveness of defibril-
lators, left ventricular assist devices, drug-eluting stents, and
powerful new drugs seem to represent win–win situations in
a culture that applauds medical breakthroughs and cele-
brates corporate profits. But these therapeutic triumphs that
have helped define modern cardiology shouldn’t distract
Americans from something we haven’t invented: a way to
care for 41 million citizens without health insurance. Today,
the U.S. has a health-cost crisis. Difficult decisions can’t be
postponed indefinitely, and tough choices must be made as
we enter a future filled with even more potent pills, powerful
devices, and promising procedures. Although the ACC
continues to update our practice guidelines to reflect impor-
tant treatment advances, the public—through its policy-
makers—will ultimately have to choose how America copes
with the cost consequences of medical progress and an aging
population.
In this country, the incredible advances in the diagnosis,
treatment, and prevention of cardiovascular disease during
the past half-century owe much to the billions of dollars
NHLBI and industry have invested in basic research and
clinical trials (26). The close relationship between clinical
trials, practice guidelines, and continuing education that
developed during the second half of the twentieth century
has saved and enhanced the lives of countless millions. We
owe special thanks to the hundreds of thousands of patients
who entrusted their lives to trialists in order to advance
medical knowledge and help others.
Today’s productive trial-guideline-education process de-
pends on truth and trust, and we must protect each element
of it from bias and excessive self-interest. Although there’s
no vaccination to eliminate conflicts of interest, we’re
getting closer to a commonsense prescription to manage
them. This is very important because a healthy and produc-
tive academic–industry interface is so vital for medical
progress. Future doctors and patients are depending on us to
further enhance the trial-guideline-education process as it
continues to mature. I think we are on the right track, and
I hope you agree.
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